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Figure 3: Example of the certainty equivalent payoff in a two-stage sequential auction
for 2 items: A (at time t=1) and B (at t=2). The graph shows the CE value of the cor-
responding 2-stage game, if the costs for both items are drawn from N(  = 2.5,σ =
1.5), for an agent with r → 0 (left) and r = 0.3 (right).
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Figure 4: The optimal bidding policy available to an agent having risk aversion r, in a
2, respectively 3-stage sequential auction. The items have a complementarity value of
$10 (resp. $15) if acquired together, but no value if acquired separately. The costs for
all items are drawn from a normal distribution N(  = 2.5,σ = 1.5).
Suppose items are divided into several types. The agent’s expectation of closing price
distributions for all items of a given particular type is the same (thus she does not model
the future expectation probability per auction or per item, but per type of item). If this
expectation remains the same during the number of bidding rounds the agent stays in
the game, then it is possible to reduce the state tree representation from a representation
dependent on the number of future auctions to a representation which depends only on
the size of the bundle the agent wishes to buy.
Formally, if there are several items of type A and the agent knows that there are nA
more auctions of items of type A to take place. Then the probability of transition from
any state X to a state X ∪ {A} (i.e. winning at least one item of type A at some point
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Average income of the seller for each sequence of 7 auctions
Figure 9: Results for the average proﬁt of the synergy buyer (left) and seller revenue (right), for
a setting with two items A (of value vAA = 10) sold in 5 auctions, and B (of value vB,B = 20)
sold in 2 auctions. Notice there is a transition, because agents with risk aversion r >= 0.5 do
not try to get the higher value bundle (of item B).
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Figure 10: Percentages of success and failure per 1000 simulation runs, for a setting with two
different types of items described above. Notice the transition at r >= 0.5, showing that risk
averse bidders do not try to get the bundle with the rarer item B, but only one of A.
threshold effect is clear from Fig. 10: at this level, the more risk averse agents stop
trying to bid for the more valuable, but also “riskier” bundle of item B (for which there
are only 2 available auctions), and go for a bundle of item A, from which there is less
absolute proﬁt to be made, but for which there are 5 available auctions.
The left-hand side of Fig. 9 shows that, while going for the bundle of item B brings,
on average, slightly more proﬁt, this result also is subject to a much higher variance, i.e.
the bidding agents are more likely to loose money by failing to complete their desired
bundle. By contrast, bidding for a bundle of type A (as the more risk-averse agents do),
can slightly decrease the average expected proﬁt, but the bidder is less likely to loose
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